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three times the amount he seeks as a recovery. Such safeguards appear
no more than reasonable when considered in the context that a plaintiff
may call on the penal machinery of the state in order to insure the satisfaction of a civil judgment.
CONCLUSION

A -similar process to the common law debtor prison system exists in
many states today, including North Carolina, despite a provision in many
state constitutions that there will be no imprisonment for debt. Today in
North Carolina statutory provisions for arrest and bail and body execution
allow civil arrest and imprisonment where a judgment is returned wholly
or partly dissatisfied in contract cases involving fraud, in cases of intentional or wilful torts, and in fiduciary cases where there is a breach
of trust.
The statutory remedies may be secured by a creditor through the
filing with the court a complaint or an affidavit alleging a statutory right
to have a defendant civilly arrested or alleging the grounds for a belief
that such right exists, along with the necessary bond set by the court.
If the court issues the order, a defendant has the right to move that it
be vacated, that the bail be reduced and that the issues be submitted to a

jury.
Civil arrest and imprisonment statutes are penal in nature without
criminal safeguards, structured for vengeance by a creditor, and represent
an anachronism inconsistent with modern jurisprudence. An adequate
reform of North Carolina statutes would require that they be restricted
to cases in which the debtor is fraudulently attempting to abscond from
the jurisdiction and that they permit a greater recovery of damages by
the defendant in order to deter would-be vengeful plaintiffs.
ERNEST

B.

FULLWOOD

A look at recent decisions involving the validity
of criminal commitments to state hospitals

LEGAL KIDNAPPING:

In a recent Pennsylvania case, Dixon v. Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 313 F. Supp. 653 (1970), the proceeding was a class suit brought by seven plaintiffs, individually and on
behalf of all inhabitants of Farview State Hospital situated like unto
them. The complaint alleges the unconstitutionality of the confinement
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at Farview of the plaintiffs committed to and confined at Farview pursuant to Section 404 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1966, 50 P.S., Section 4404' after the original
authority for their confinements predicated on criminal convictions or
charges had terminated.
The plaintiffs were committed to Farview pursuant to Section 404
in the following manner:
(a) The applications for these recommitments were not made by a
relative or guardian or person standing in loco parentis to the plaintiffs.
(b) The applicant for recommitment was the Director of Social
Services of Farview or another member of the Farview staff.
(c) The applications were supported by certificates of two physicians
who were members of the staff at Farview.
(d) The applications were submitted to the Superintendent of Farview who "received" the plaintiffs.
' Section 404 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act
of 1966, 50 P.S., Section 4404, provides:
Commitment on application by relative, etc.; physicians' certificates; review.
(a) A written application for commitment to a facility may be made in
the interest of any person who appears to be mentally disabled and in need
of care. It may be made by a relative, guardian, friend, individual standing
in loco parentis to the person to be committed, or by the executive office
or an authorized agent of a governmental or recognized nonprofit health
or welfare organization or agency or any responsible person.
(b) Such application shall be accompanied by the certificates of two
physicians who have examined the person whose commitment is sought,
within one week of the date of the certificates, and who have found that, in
their opinion, such person is mentally disabled and in need of care. In the
case of a mentally retarded person, the physicians' certification shall be accompanied by the report of a psychologist. No person shall be committed hereunder if any certificate is dated more than thirty days prior to the date of
commitment, except that if the mental disability consists of mental retardation, the certificates may be dated not more than three months prior to the
date of commitment. The application, certificates and the report, if any,
shall be signed and sworn to or affirmed.
(c) The director may receive the person named in the application and
detain him until discharge in accordance with the provisions of this act.
When application is made by any person other than a relative or guardian,
the director upon reception of the person named in the application shall notify
the appropriate relative or guardian of such person of the commitment.
(d) Every commitment made under this section except those to the
Veterans Administration or other agency of the United States Government,
shall be reviewed at least annually by a committee appointed by the director
from the professional staff of the facility wherein the person is detained, to
determine whether continued care and commitment are necessary. Said
committee shall make written recommendations to the director which shall be
filed at the facility, and be open to inspection and review by the department,
and such other persons as the secretary, by regulation, may permit.
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(e) The plaintiffs thus committed were not consulted concerning their
wishes about continued confinement or given notice of the filing of the
applications by the Director of Social Services or others on the staff at
Farview.
(f) No relative, guardian or friend was consulted by the Director
of Social Services or others on the staff at Farview concerning the continued confinement of the plaintiffs.
(g) The plaintiffs thus committed were not represented by counsel
in the proceedings leading to their recommitments.
(h) The plaintiffs had no independent psychiatric diagnosis or
psychological evaluation in connection with either the decision of the
Director of Social Services to apply for commitment or the certifications
by physicians that they were mentally disabled and in need of care.
(i) No court made a finding that the recommitted plaintiffs required
inpatient care.
(j) There is no period fixed by the statute after which persons committed under Section 404 must be released.
The plaintiffs contended that Section 404 was unconstitutional on
its face and also as applied to the plaintiffs. The courts agreed, utilizing
the decisions in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), and Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
In Specht, the petitioner-defendant had been convicted of "indecent
liberties" under a Colorado statute that carried a maximum sentence of
ten years' but had not been sentenced under it. Later he was sentenced
under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act 3 to an indeterminate term of
from one day to life without notice and full hearing. Mr. Justice Douglas,
386 U.S. 609-610 quoted an opinion in United States ex. rel. Gerchmon
v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (1906), analogizing the proceedings
based on the two comparable sections of the Pennsylvania Burr-Walker
Act 4 dealing with sex offenses, as follows:
It (the Pennsylvania Burr-Walker Act proceeding permitted incarceration from one day to life) is a separate criminal proceeding which may
be invoked after conviction of one of the specified crimes. Petitioner
therefore was entitled to a full judicial hearing before the magnified
sentence was imposed. At such a hearing the requirements of due
process cannot be satisfied by partial or niggardly procedural protec2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., Section 40-2-32 (1963).
' Colo. Rev. Stat., Sections 39-19-1 to -10 (1963).
' Pa. Stat. Tit. 19, Sections 1166 and 1170 (1964).
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tions. A defendant in such a proceeding is entitled to the full panoply
of the relevant protections which due process guarantees in State criminal proceedings. He must be afforded all these safegards which are
fundamental rights and essential to a fair trial, including the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
The courts found Section 404 to be almost completely devoid of the
due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment. It also
leaned toward a decision rendered in Denton v. Commonwealth, 383
S.W.2d 681 (1964) where the court took the position that committing
procedures and rules of commitment should be the same in either a civil
proceeding or criminal/quasi criminal proceeding.
The courts held in Dixon that Section 404 was unconstitutional on
its face and in violation of the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In an earlier New York case, Baxstrom v. Herald, 383 U.S. 107
(1966), it was held that equal protection of the laws required that when
a male prisoner in the New York Department of Corrections hospital for
mentally ill male prisoners, neared the end of his criminal sentence, he
should be given a jury review of the determination as to his sanity in
conformity with proceedings granted all others civilly committed under
New York Mental Hygiene Law; the petitioner was also entitled to a
hearing under the procedure granted to all others to determine whether
he was so dangerously mentally ill that he must remain in a Department
of Corrections hospital.
In 1969 in Mills v. State of Delaware, 256 A.2d 752, the appellants
raised the question of the constitutional validity of the statutory procedures under which the appellant was committed to, and was being held
at, the Delaware State Hospital upon a verdict of not guilty by reason
of mental illness. The courts held that a patient who is committed to
a state hospital under the statute authorizing commitment upon rendition
of an insanity verdict would be deprived of substantial safeguards as to
release from the hospital that are provided to persons civilly committed
and therefore would be denied equal protection.
The court saved the statute from constitutional attack by "straining
the construction" of the statute and held the commitment valid and construed the statute as to the legality of continued detention of such
patients as requiring a jury trial on issue of present mental condition.
In Delaware the statute authorizing the recommitment to a state
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hospital of persons found not guilty by reason of mental illness, is 11
Del. C. § 4702(a) (b) which provides:
(a) Whenever a determination is made that a person is 'not guilty
by reason of mental illness,' the court shall order that the person so
acquitted be committed to the Delaware State Hospital.
(b) Whenever a person is committed pursuant to subsection (a) of
this section, the courts shall review at least twice per year the status
of such person, and at such time as the court is informed by the
Delaware State Hospital that the defendant no longer represents a
danger to the public he shall:
(1) be released from custody; or
(2) be temporarily released from custody under such conditions
of treatment and for such period of time as the court may
prescribe. 5
The Mills case held that in satisfying the "equal protection" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a patient committed under Section 4702
and a civilly committed patient under 16 Del. C. § 5125 have the same
status in the State Hospital as patients to be treated and cured. The
court stated that the fact the Section 4702 patient had been charged with
crime is not a reasonable basis for distinguishing him from the Section
5125 patient in the procedures for determining the cessation of his
mental abnormality and his qualification for release from the hospital.'
' The Delaware statute does not permit a special hearing after the jury has
reached the verdict of mental illness. 11 Del. C. § 4701 requires that mental illness, as a defense in a criminal case, be "established to the satisfaction of the jury
impaneled on its trial." Upon the plea of mental illness, the defendant has the
burden of proving his mental illness by a preponderance of the evidence.
'16 Del. C. § 5125 is a civil commitment, the applicable statute for release, once
civilly committed, is 16 Del. C. § 5126, which in pertinent part states:
Application to Court of Chancery by committed person for determination of
sanity; procedure

(a) Upon the commitment of any person to the Hospital, the person
committed, or any one person related to the person committed within the
third degree of consanguinity, or any other three persons may present a sworn
petition to the Court of Chancery at any time setting forth the time and
manner of the commitment and that he or they verily believes or believe the
person committed to be a sane person, and praying that a writ issue to the
sheriff of the county to determine whether the person committed to be a sane
or an insane person.
(b) The Court shall thereupon forthwith make an order directing the
Register of Chancery to forthwith issue a writ de lunatico inquirendo to
the sheriff of the county, commanding him within five days after the service
of the writ to summon a jury, and have determined by the jury whether the
person committed be a sane or an insane person, and make return of the
same to the court within two days after the finding thereof by the jury.
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The court in interpreting and defining the statute Section 4702 held
that there should be a jury trial conducted to ascertain whether or not
the patient should be released. The jury should be (1) before a regular
Superior Court judge; (2) to try the issue of whether the patient is a
dangerously mentally ill person; and (3) with the burden of proof upon
the patient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence freedom from
such mental illness and dangerous propensities.
Thus, under the committing statutes implemented by the holding in
the Mills case, the patient's rights are protected as to the due process
and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION

The "modern trend" by the courts seems to be the upholding of the
individual's rights by full protection under the law.
It appears that the basic fundamental constitutional rights have been
violated and "legal kidnapping" has been substituted. The courts, as
evidenced by the recent decision, have apparently recognized this fact
and appear to be saying that commitments to mental institutions do
deprive the individual of his fundamental rights; therefore, the committing authorities must be sure the commitment is valid, and the individual afforded due process and equal protection under the law.
BERNARD

J.

GARTLAND

No Fault Automotive Insurance
Four states to date have passed No Fault Insurance legislation: Massachusetts, Illinois, Florida and Delaware. Many states will probably pass
similar legislation in the not too distant future. This automotive insurance
represents a change in the law of torts and eliminates the fault concept
of negligence to a limited degree. No Fault Insurance represents the beginning of a sociological change as well as a legal change where we are
more concerned with total relationship of making one whole again who
was injured in an automobile accident rather than who was at fault in
causing the accident. Whether or not No Fault Insurance is good or bad
(c) If the finding of the jury be that the person committed is a sane
person, the sheriff shall forthwith make an order upon the Superintendent
of the Hospital, and, if he be absent, upon any official of the Hospital, commanding that the person therein committed be immediately released from

the Hospital.
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